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ABSTRACT
Kropotkin's extensive writings on criminological
issues have been almost totally neglected. Through
critical historical and macro-structural analyses
Kropotkin assessed institutional arrangements
disclosing how they were or were not meeting human
needs. Our exploration focuses on Kropotkin's
theoretical contributions, his feelings-based
criminology and his extremely insightful dualistic
conceptualization of "human nature". His
contributions to penology, and his assessment of
social arrangements which would meet the complex and
ever-changing needs of humankind are briefly examined.
Kropotkin's analytic framework provides an insightful
and provocative base from which to synthesize
criminological thought and research and from which to
take action to alter social arrangements which do not
meet human needs.
Although Peter Kropotkin wrote extensively on
criminological issues, criminologists have neither
acknowledged his insights nor adopted his analytical
framework. Perhaps this has occurred because
anarchist perspectives have been perceived as beyond
the scope of acceptable criminological thought; or
perhaps because feelings, which some feel have no
place in scientific discourse, hold a central place in
Kropotkin's analyses. Regardless of the reason for
neglect, Kropotkin's ethical humanism and analyses of
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social life are both infused with passionate moral
concern and significant for humanistic criminology.
His devotion to uplifting the quality of human
life led him to develop a comprehensive and coherent
social theory. This theory is as insightful and
applicable today as then, for within it he explored:
1) what is necessary to transcend the criminal
conditions of current social life; 2) what are the
practical means for the development of social life in
more humane directions; and 3) what actions can be
taken to promote social life in these directions.
According to Kropotkin, most analyses of
political-economy and criminology are essentially
presentations of what seems to be true under current
social conditions. However, these conditions,
especially the political-economic ones, are rarely
stated and analyzed. Consequently, most
political-economists and criminologists present the
facts which arise under these conditions and,
frequently, these conditions themselves, as natural,
universalistic, and inevitable.
In Kropotkin's view political-economy and
criminology should not only be historical,
cross-species, cross-cultural, and macro-structural,
but they should have an entirely different problem in
view. Criminologists and humanistic criminologists
especially, should ask: 1) what forms of social life
assure to a given society, and to humankind generally,
the greatest amount of happiness, and hence also the
greatest amount of vitality; 2) what forms of social
life allow this amount of happiness and vitality to
become more complete and more varied (Kropotkin,
1903:58, 59); and 3) what forms of social life direct
the activities of individuals so as to receive from
them the greatest benefit for the welfare of all,
without at the same time paralyzing personal energies
(Kropotkin, 1924). Humanistic criminologists should
study the needs of persons in social life and the
various means, both previously utilized and available
under the present state of knowledge, for their
satisfaction (Kropotkin, 1903:72, 73). We should
analyze to what degree the present institutional
arrangements are expedient, economic or wasteful,
beneficial or harmful, and morally acceptable. Then,
since the ultimate end of every inquiry is its
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practical application to life, we should concern
ourselves with the discovery of means for the
satisfaction of these needs with the smallest possible
waste of human labor and other resources and with the
greatest benefit to humankind in general. 1
NEEDS-BASED CRIMINOLOGY
Following Kropotkin's analytic framework, we
might study the needs of persons for: 1) acclimation
to ("protection from") other natural forces
(temperature extremes, wind, rain, sun, etc.); 2)
social life within a healthful natural environment-
"clean", non-polluted air, nutritious, non-poisoned
food and water, etc.; 3) social life without any form
of coercion in movement, association, or action; 4)
social arrangements that allow for both sociality and
privacy; and 5) social life wherein our perceived
harms, conflicts, and injustices do not spiral into
disputes th t may lay us open to external imposition
and invasion.
To briefly illustrate Kropotkin's analytic
framework, let us consider each of three basic needs -
shelter, healthful environment, and non-invaded social
life, discuss how each need could be met, and what
presently hinders the satisfaction of each need.
SHELTER
All persons feel the need for appropriate and
comfortable shelter. Considering the present
technological capacity and the organizational and
working capacity of persons for shelter construction,
every person or grouping of persons could have access
to need fulfilling shelter. The question is: What is
hindering them from such access when it is readily
acknowledged that every person, family, grouping or
collective could easily have access to comfortable
shelter, apartment, house, or set of rooms.
A certain number of days' labor would suffice to
build warm and lighted shelters. But many persons
living within current social arrangements have no
access to such shelter because shelter producing
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arrangements are not oriented to human need. They are
oriented to the production of profit, to a sizable
return on investment, and to capital accumulation. As
people must presently sell their labor to satisfy the
wants and interests of elites, they have neither the
necessary leisure nor the necessary capital to singly
or collectively build shelters. As long as these
shelter producing relations remain unchanged many
persons are and will continue to be forced to inhabit
unsafe, crowded, inappropriate, "sub-standard," or
non-need fulfilling shelters.
Shelter producing relations oriented to human
need are contrary to the orientation of the
"sheltered" economists who immortalize the so-called
"laws of production", tabulate the number of shelters
built each year, and demonstrate by statistics that as
the number of newly-built and renovated shelters is
too small to meet demand, many persons and groupings
must live in human misery.
HEALTHFUL AND SAFE ENVIRONMENT
More criminologically, all persons feel the need
of a healthful and safe environment. We do not need
to be poisoned with unhealthful water, food, or air.
Taking the capacity of persons for social organization
and the present capacity for production, every person
can have access to such air, water, and food. The
question is: What is hindering them from such access
when it is universally acknowledged that every
person or group could easily have access to "clean"
air, "pure" water, and "nutritious" food. No labor
should be required to breathe "clean" air, and a
certain number of days' labor would suffice to
di stribute pure water and tend the growth of, harvest,
and distribute nutritious food. But many persons
living within current social conditions have very
limited access to suitable food, water, and air,
because production arrangements are not oriented to
consumption or human need; they are oriented to
profit, capital accumulation, imperialism, and the
vain consumptive needs of elites.
There is little possibility, then, for a safe,
non-poisonous environment under these "productive"
conditions. However, modern agri -corporate-state
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economists demonstrate by statistics that it is too
costly not to have acid rain, and not to poison the
earth during food production. Since "impure" air and
water are produced surpluses (by-products) of
industrial economies of scale, most persons have
little choice but to breathe and drink these
surpluses. On the other hand, nutritious food is a
produced scarcity, too costly to be profitable to meet
demand; therefore, many persons must either starve or
eat an inadequate and non-nutritious, and/or toxic
diet.
NON-INVADED SOCIAL LIFE
Perhaps these illustrations seem uninstructive
because they are more "economic" than
"criminological". However, basic safety needs, needs
criminologists might analyze using Kropotkin's
framework, are clearly not separable from other basic
human needs. A divisive specialization of mental work
has seemingly generated a disoperation of inquiry
wherein the needs of humankind and those of the whole
of nature have been lost. A thorough analysis of the
need for non-invaded social life requires an
integrated understanding of how needs could be met and
what hinders need satisfaction. It requires an
understanding of both the concept of appropriation and
Kropotkin's feelings-based criminology.
Certainly, coordinating actions to restrict the
production and/or distribution of nutritious food or
to proliferate poisons during its production is not
refining the quality of human social life; it is
destroying it. It is appropriating the health,
well-being, and perhaps the lives of others. 3 It is
committing social harms. Such actions do not
illustrate social cooperation; but rather, social
disoperation. Most persons wish neither to poison,
harm, appropriate, nor to starve others either
directly or indirectly. Furthermore, most persons
wish neither to invade, nor to be invaded, either
directly or indirectly, by industrial/agricultural
economic policies, by muggers, or for reasons of
state.
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FEELINGS-BASED CRIMINOLOGY
Clearly, in the illustrations given, our human
economy, the division of labor, and the organization
of production are not carried out with the aim of
securing the well-being and safety of all, while
stimulating the energies of the individual to benefit
self, nature, and humankind simultaneously. Socially
produced wealth is being severely restricted,
individual and collective energies enormously
squandered. Vast resources are being exerted for the
production and deployment of armanents to conquer
markets and facilitate exploitation; for officials,
bureaucrats, and agents of state to maintain the power
of a few to misdirect productive relations in their
egocentric interests; for judges, prisons, police, and
all the paraphernalia of so-called justice; for the
propagation of news, reality, language, and pernicious
doctrines in the interests of party, politician, and
speculator; for the production of objects that are
useless or harmful, by means which are poisonous of
nature, human existence, and human relationships, and
wherein the love of work and the capacity for
invention are destroyed (Kropotkin, 1913a:20).
But let us become more traditionally
criminological in our illustrations and discuss the
need to be uninvaded in our social life. A critical
assessment of our current social arrangements
indicates that they thwart the growth of social
sentiment, and according to Kropotkin, it is social
sentiment or the feelings that we have for one another
and for life in all its forms that affects the quality
of our life, the degrees of freedom that we enjoy, and
the degrees of invasion and coercion that we suffer.
We must discover what feelings promote sociality and
what social arrangements stimulate and orient
individual energies toward the needs of and the
well-being of all, and what social arrangements retard
the growth of these social sentiments.
According to Kropotkin, a certain degree ofidentification of the individual with the group to
which s/he belongs has necessarily existed since the
very beginning of social life (Kropotkin, 1924:30).Sociality - relating with others and developing human
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solidarity - and mutual aid have been significant
factors in the evolution of the animal world and the
unfolding of human history (Kropotkin, 1972). To the
extent that cooperation and mutual aid have become
patterned and established customs within the human
community they engender feelings of sympathy and
commiseration - the ability to realize and to feel the
suffering and pain of others. Furthermore, the
practice of mutual aid and the feelings of solidarity
and commiseration give rise to feelings of equity - a
recognition of the equal intrinsic value of every
human person. 4 It is only when one considers another
as one's equal that one can project the negative
equality ethic, "do not unto another what you would
not have another do unto you", or the positive
equality ethic, "do unto another as you would have
them do unto you."
The feelings of solidarity, commiseration, and
equality and their consequent equality ethic generate
a feeling of concern for the well-being of others and
in particular for the development of a principle of
equal well-being. The principle of distributive
justice, "to each according to his/her needs, taking
into account the resources available to the
community," is one such principle (Kropotkin, 1913a:
D. Miller, 1976). When social relationships and
institutional arrangements based on these feelings are
solidly established in the human community the ground
is prepared for the development of relationships
within which magnanimity, self-abnegation, and
self-sacrifice regularly occur (Kropotkin, 1924). In
these relationships each person understands and feels
so deeply the bearing of one's action on other members
of the group or community and other forces in nature
that one refrains from consciously harming or invading
others, even though one may have to forego the
gratification of some of one's own desires (Kropotkin,
1904:225-226). Each person so fully identifies one's
feelings with those of others that one is willing to
share or give to others one's talents and powers
without thought of what one will receive in return
(Kropotkin, 1924:244-246). Each person is willing to
spread one's intellect, feelings, and actions lavishly
for the good of each and all (Kropotkin, 1924:244;
1927b:107-109). Furthermore, the more the principles
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of solidarity and equality are developed; 1) the
greater the chance society has of surviving; 2) the
more thoroughly each member of the society feels
his/her solidarity with each other member; and 3) the
more completely are developed in all of these persons
two critical qualities needed for social development:
courage and free individual initiative (Kropotkin,
1927b:96).
HUMAN AND PERSONAL DIGNITY
According to Kropotkin, interacting with and
feeling solidarity and an identity with the equal
well-being of others leads to a full sense of personal
dignity and the need to respect the personal dignity
of others. It is then that the positive equality
ethic, "do unto another as you would have them do unto
you," takes on more humanistic meaning. While
encompassing the ideas - every human person has equal
intrinsic value, and one ought to place oneself in
another's place and consciously consider whether or
not an action would be acceptable if one were the
receiver, - "do unto another as you would have them
do unto you," signifies taking one's personal
standard-or conception of fair treatment and
projecting it onto another. In a genuine, humanistic,
needs-based conception one would no longer
specifically project, "do unto another as you would
have them do unto you," but rather, "respond to
another person as that specific person would like
you to respond to them," or "respond to another person
according to how that person wishes to be responded to
under the circumstances." 5  This ethic encourages
directness and communication, and it is only then that
one begins to appreciate and dignify the uniqueness of
each individual person, the specific circumstances,
and the special relationships involved. It is only
then that one can move beyond mechanical conceptions
of human equality that present a consensual model of
ethics, dehumanize the person, and imply the necessity
of a treator-authority relationship.
A sense of personal dignity is thus a trenchant
starting point for the construction of social forms
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that develop and reinforce feelings that lead us to
relate with one another with respect, well-being,
inviolability, and non-invasion (Kropotkin, 1924).
Returning to our criminological illustration, our need
for movement, association, and sociality without
coercion and invasion can be socially constructed when
we feel we have personal dignity and see that this
dignity is inextricably linked with the dignity of
others. It is only then that individuals are able to
give free reign to their inclinations and passions
without any other restraint than their deep concern,
love, and respect for the feelings of those who
surround them.
Humanistic criminologists must consider what
personal dignity means to different persons, in
different social settings; and what within our current
cultural and social arrangements contributes to and
diminishes personal dignity. If one does not feel
personal dignity, how does this affect one's actions
and relations with others? Do these feelings lead to
harming others, to appropriations and invasions, and
to social structures of indignity that un-dignify
others on a regular basis? What are the processes and
means by which persons define their harms, invasions,
and appropriations as non-harms so as to legitimize
their actions or remain less conscious of their real
effect on others? Are personal dignity, and thus,
human dignity promoted by current religious practices
and beliefs? Are they promoted by a division of labor
and nature of work that is devoid of intellectual
stimulation, the spirit of invention, and aesthetic
pleasure; when work is felt to be meaningless,
useless, fragmented, impersonal, carried out in
isolation without talent engenderment and without
concern for the well-being of most persons (Kropotkin,
1913a; 1913b)? Are personal and human dignity
promoted by arrangements that separate mind from body,
feelings from thought, self from others; by practices
that enjoin us to commit to others the care of our own
affairs and, thus, construct the feelings of
indifference to others and collective issues
(Kropotkin, 1903:67, 68)?6 Are they promoted by
hypocrisy and sophistry that result from the practice
of a double-faced morality - an attempt to teach the
ethics of equality while every day in our
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relationships practicing hierarchy and the doctrine of
inequality (Kropotkin, 1913a; Kropotkin, 1903:67)?
Is personal dignity enhanced or diminished by the
state, law, and penal sanction (police, judge,
correctional personnel), which serve to sanctify and
maintain structural inequality and social disoperation
and which, as well, give rise to a spectacle of
espionage, false witness, spying, threats, and
corruption (Kropotkin, 1913a:12)? Do the social
arrangements within which we now "exist" promote the
growth of social sentiment, commiseration, equity,
self respect, and a sense of personal dignity? Is it
possible to have either human dignity or a non-invaded
social life (safety) when each person is severely
constrained from developing a full sense of personal
dignity?
KROPOTKIN'S CRIMINOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
To grasp Kropotkin's analytical framework and
criminological insights 7 even more fully one must
understand that he perceived human nature as
dualistic, as composed of two sets of contrasting
feelings (Kropotkin, 1924; 1914). In the first set
are feelings that answer to the human need for mutual
sympathy and unity. These feelings induce us to unite
and cooperate to insure peace, and equality, to settle
disputes and to (promote mutual aid) help one another
in efforts requiring cooperative effort to attain
common ends (Kropotkin, 1903; 6-7). In the second set
are feelings that answer to the human need to assert
oneself, to struggle. These feelings induce us to
break the bonds, always prone to crystallize, that the
collectivity (tribe, community, or state) presses upon
the individual. These feelings stimulate creativity,
risk taking, and social change, while impeding social
stagnation, group tyranny and suppression. These
feelings also, however, induce us to effect individual
and/or group superiority (economic, political,
spiritual) and/or to objectify and control others for
our individual or group ends.
With this human dualism in mind, Kropotkin
analyzed how specific social arrangements or social
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forms, such as the wage system (Kropotkin, 1887;
1913a:214-236; 1920) the division of labor (Kropotkin,
1913a:247-296; 1913b), the state (Kropotkin, 1970;
1913c; 1909; 1971c; 1888, 1914b), law (Kropotkin,
1927e; 1886), and prison (Kropotkin, 1971a; 1971b;
1927f) negatively affect the quality of social life
and the degree of personal dignity by significantly
promoting the superiority inducements of the second
set of feelings and relations (invasions, coercions)
while retarding the first set of feelings and
relations (mutual sentiment, sociality). 8 Searching
for a synthesis of this dualistic conception of human
nature Kropotkin (1924), as well, explored and
proposed social forms that could produce aggregative
well-being while concomitantly stimulating the
creative and assertive energies of individuals.
However, Kropotkin (1927d:157) saw no final resolution
of these contrasting sets of feelings, only the
possibility of temporary harmony undergoing continous
change: 9
..... by a sum of social customs and habits
not petrified by law, routine, or superstition,
but continually developing and continually
readjusting in accordance with the evergrowing
requirements of a free life stimulated by the
process of science, invention, and the steady
growth of higher ideals ......... No
crystallization and immobility, but a continual
evolution such as we see in nature.
Kropotkin meant these social forms to be uplifting,
humanistic and, as well, practicable. The listing
below illustrates some of these proposed social
forms. 10
Hierarchical Social Forms Humanistic Social Forms
The State Voluntary, federated,
autonomous collectivities
of producers and
consumers
The Wage System Distribution according to
need; the separation of
contribution from
distribution
Division of Labor Integration of industrial
and agricultural produc-
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tion; of mental and
manual work; production
for the well-being of
each and all
Law and Prison True morality and the
ethics of human dignity;
retrospective modes of
conflict resolution;
integration and sociality
What may most interest humanistic criminologists
are, however, his radically humanistic, scathingly
critical, and insightful essays on topics well within
the scope of traditional criminological inquiry. Let
us very briefly turn to the hub of these critiques and
analyses.
THE STATE AND LAW
The State (Kropotkin, 1970; 1913c) and the wage
system (Kropotkin, 1913a; 1887; 1920) were inseparable
concepts to Kropotkin. As symbiotic institutions they
emerged historically by mutually supporting and
reinforcing each other (Kropotkin, 1903:76). In his
analyses of the historical role of the state 1 and the
nature of the modern state, he concluded (Kropotkin,
1913c: May 1914:34):
The fact is, that the great Capital and
the State are two parallel growths which
never could have existed without each other,
and for that reason must be combatted
together. The State would never have
grown and acquired the power it has
now - not even the power it had under
the Roman emperors, or the Pharoahs of
Egypt, the Assyrians kings, and so on -
had it not favored the growth of capital,
agricultural and industrial, and the
exploiting - to begin with - of wild
tribes and shepherds, of peasants later
on, and of industrial working men in our
own times.
It was by protecting with its
whip, its sword, and its clergy those
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who grabbed the land and brought free
men into slavery and serfdom, that
Capitalism was developed; and it was by
forcing those who owned nothing to work
for the landlords, the owners of the
mines, the company promoters, and the
industrial employers, that gradually was
developed that formidable organization,
the present State. If Capitalism could
never have reached its present
development without the aid of the State,
the State in its turn could never have
been the power it is now were it not for
the support it always gave to Capitalism
and the exploiting of labour.
The State enabled members of the capitalist class
to assert authority over people, to control and
exploit their labor, while at the same time both
individual and collective autonomy was being crushed
for reason of state (Kropotkin, 1970:264). As society
became more and more divided into two hostile classes,
habits and customs of dominating and appropriating
others' action, labor, and lives were slowly,
structurally entrenched and law was introduced to
sanctify these arrangements to place them beyond
question (Kropotkin, 1927e:205). 12  Law serves, then,
as the inversion of community and the diminisher of
human dignity as it legitimates human objectification
and appropriation. Law sanctified such appropriations
as the right to deny access to well-being and needed
resources (food, shelter, use of the means of
survival/production); the right to define persons and
other forms of nature as property; and the right of
agents of state to rob through taxation and to punish
with impunity. Thus, most laws were created to ensure
the external existence of inequality, to protect the
conditions of the accumulation of wealth acquired
through the exploitation of others, to rob the
wage-slave social producer of a part of what s/he had
partially created (property laws), and to legitimate
and support the arrangements of state (Kropotkin,
1927e:211; 1920). However, to ensure acceptance and
obedience these codes also embodied and sanctified
socially anterior habits and customs that are rooted
in the feelings of solidarity and equality and
essential to the very being of society) 3 Law, thus,
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included rights to guarantee that one respect
another's person and their life, and that one not
assault, batter, or violate another. As such, law has
maintained this skillful commingling, this two-fold
character of social custom and class/elite advantage,
of equality and inequality, up to today (Kropotkin,
1927e:205). Clearly while communicating the value,
equality ("equality before the law"), law, by
unquestioned assumption, conceals arrangements or
structures of inequality. As such, law and authority
are unnecessary for human relationships and, in fact,
are harmful to them (Kropotkin, 1927e:212). Laws on
property are not made to guarantee either to the
individual or to society the enjoyment of the product
of social labor or to guarantee the well-being of all.
On the contrary, they are made to rob the producer of
a part of what has been created, and to secure to
certain other persons that portion of the product
which they have stolen either from the producers or
from society as a whole (Kropotkin, 1927d:212). Laws
for the protection of government have no other end
than to maintain, patch up, and develop the machinery
that serves almost entirely to protect the privileges
of the possessing class (Kropotkin, 1927e:212). The
category of laws for the protection of persons in
society and the detection and prevention of "crime",
are, according to Kropotkin, equally as useless and
injurious as the preceding categories of law
(Kropotkin, 1927e:215).
According to Kropotkin, most "crimes" as defined
by law are motivated by reactions to the economic
arrangements (deprivation, alienation, acquisitive and
competitive pressures) and mirror the aggression,
violence, and exploitation of the instituted
political-economy. Most "crimes" are instigated by
the desire to obtain possession of others' property
and will disappear with the disappearance of the
institution of property. The existence of the wage
system, the class system, is the true ground for
"criminality"; and the conditions of life to which
each class is subjected amply explains the nature of
and incidence of "crime", social harm, and invasion so
produced. Within the non-owning class, desperation,
spirtual deprivation, and sporadic and disciplined
regimentation within wage slavery insure that many
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persons will enact the fate of their class and
interact so as to become intra-class victims and
perpetrators of defined "illegalities." Members of
the owning class, in contrast, have the power to
define most of their actions ("illegalities") and
social harms as non-harms and/or non-"crimes"
(Kropotkin, 1888; 1914; 1909). Their actions or
"illegalities" are thus beyond incrimination (Kennedy,
1970; Tifft, 1979; 1982; Tifft and Sullivan, 1980;
Foucault, 1977) and are of an essentially inter-class,
yet affecting all forms of nature, genre.
CRIME AND PRISON
Kropotkin's conception of "crime", then, as
traditionally and legally defined, identifies two
essential sources. The first source is the social
forms that create a maldistribution of socially
created wealth: the property system, the wage system,
and the concentrated control of the political-economy,
which is misdirected from the needs and well-being of
all persons. The law, which reflects, protects, and
perpetuates these forms, is a point of contact and
conflict between those subjected to these forms and
those propogating them. Transgressing these laws is
an inevitable consequence of both the feelings of
sociality, social defense, and mutual aid and the
feelings of self assertion. Crime is thus a perennial
feature of the nature of this social order (Kropotkin,
1927b:71-73) 1 4
The state, by punishing, by imprisoning, attempts
to relieve us of thinking of crimes as outgrowths of
our values and our institutional arrangements.
When a child has commited a fault,
it is so easy to punish - it puts an end
to all discussions. It is so easy to hang
a man - it relieves us of thinking of the
cause of crimes (Kropotkin, 1927c:135).
As crime is a perennial feature of the nature of
this social order, neither the fear of punishment nor
its severity could possibly have any appreciable
effect on the incidence of "crime" or social harms.
In fact, according to Kropotkin (1902:10), every legal
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punishment is legalized vengeance, vengeance made
obligatory.
We are continually being told of the
benefits conferred by law, and the beneficial
effect of penalties, but have the speakers
ever attempted to strike a balance between
the benefits attributed to laws and
penalties, and the degrading effect of
these penalties upon humanity? Only
calculate all the evil passions awakened
in mankind by the atrocious punishments
formerly inflicted in our streets! Man
is the cruelist animal upon earth. And
who has pampered and developed the cruel
instincts unknown, even among monkeys,
if it is not the king, the judge, and the
priests, armed with law, who caused flesh
to be torn off in strips, boiling pitch to
be poured into wounds, limbs to be
dislocated, bones to be crushed, men to be
sawn asunder to maintain their authority?
Only estimate the torrent of depravity
let loose in human society by the "informing"
which is countenanced by judges, and paid
in hard cash by governments, under pretext
of assisting in the discovery of "crime"
Only go into the jails and study what man
becomes when he is deprived of freedom and
shut up with other depraved beings, steeped
in vice and corruption which oozes from the
very walls of our existing prisons. Only
remember that the more these prisons are
reformed, the more detestable they become...
Finally, consider what corruption, what
depravity of mind is kept up among men by
the idea of obedience, the very essence of
law; of chastisement; of authority having
the right to punish, to judge irrespective
of our conscience and the esteem of our
friends; of the necessity for executioners,
jailers, and informers - in a word, by all
the attributes of law and authority.
Consider all this, and you will assuredly
agree with us in saying that a law
inflicting penalties is an abomination
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which should cease to exist (Kropotkin,
1927e:216-217).
Similarly, the state, by treating, incapacitating
or eugenically eliminating, attempts to relieve us of
thinking of crimes, pathologies, disease and economic
conditions as outgrowths of our values and our
institutional arrangements. Kropotkin (1912:77)
decried the narrowness of the Eugenics Congress for
excluding from discussion the vast domain where
eugenics came in contact with social hygiene, and for
attempting to ignore scientific evidence that crimes
were a manufactured product of society itself.
Before granting to society the right
of sterilization of persons affected by
disease, the feeble-minded, the
unsuccessful in life, the epilectics .....
is it not our ..... duty to carefully study
the social roots and causes of these
diseases ....... Just now 100,000
children have been in need of food
in consequence of a social conflict.
Is it not the duty of Eugenics to study
the effects of a prolonged privation
of food upon the generation that has been
submitted to such a calamity?
Destroy the slums, build healthy
dwellings ..... and be not afraid, as
you often are now, of "making Socialism";
remember that to pave the streets, to
bring a supply of water to a city, is
already what they call to "make
Socialism"; and you will have improved
the germ plasm of the next generation
much more than you might have done by
any amount of sterilization.
And then, once these questions
have been raised, don't you think that
the question as to "who are the unfit"
must necessarily come to the front? Who
indeed? The workers or the idlers
[the rich]? The women of the people,
who suckle their children themselves
or the ladies who are unfit for
maternity because they [refuse to]
perform all the duties of a mother?
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Those who produce degenerates in the
slums, or those who produce degenerates
in palaces (Kropotkin, 1912:78)?
The second and derivative source of "crime" is
the moral degradation and demoralization pressed upon
the non-owning class and enforced by invidious,
panopticonic modes of social discipline. According to
Kropotkin, economic relationships are moral
relationships (Kropotkin, 1920), and the class
conditions of the non-owning class tend to dull the
moral feelings of some so exposed. The expectations
and realities of "failure" and the acceptance of one's
class "fate" leads some to despair, resignation, and
self assertions that dull the moral and caring
feelings they have for self. This, in turn, leads
some persons to attempt to alter these realities and
conditions by altering self (alcoholism/substance
"abuse", mental "illness"). These same class
conditions, expectations, and realities, however, lead
others to feel anger and hate and to undertake self
assertions that dull the moral and caring feelings
they have for others. This, in turn, leads some
persons to attempt to search for power-control,
esteem, reputation, and identity by altering others
via physical aggression (rape, assault) and/or
acquisitional invasion (theft, robbery).15
Invidious and panopticonic modes of social
discipline not only enforce these criminogenic class
conditions, but invade the state's penal discipline,
as well .16 Just as the mode of disciplined work in
the factory is individually isolating (to prevent
social solidarity), spatially locating (to centralize
control and observation), and specializing (to
routinize, make replaceable, and thus reduce any
critical dependence on any specific worker), the
discipline of the prison is designed similarly and
specifically to crush the will of the prisoner
(Kropotkin 1927f; Foucault, 1977). As the worker is
made docile and prevented from expressing his/her
creativity, the prisoner is correspondingly trained to
abandon the exercise of discretion, initiative, and
self-reliance. The prisoner is alternately subjected
to idleness or compelled to work as punishment, which
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is naturally revolting anci in no way resembles true
work - the need for self-expression, creativity, and
self-extension to others, sharing (Kropotkin,
1927f:223). Imprisonment diminishes the finer human
sentiments.
In the sombre life of the prisoner
which flows by without passion or emotion,
all the finer sentiments rapidly become
atrophied. The skilled workers who loved
their trade lose their taste for work.
Bodily energy slowly disappears. The mind
no longer has the energy for sustained
attention; thought is less rapid, and in
any case less persistent. It loses depth.
It seems to me that the lowering of nervous
energy in prisons is due, above all, to the
lack of varied impressions. In ordinary
life a thousand sounds and colors strike our
senses daily, a thousand little facts come to
our consciousness and stimulate the activity of
our brains. No such things strike the prisoners'
senses. Their impressions are few and always
the same (Kropotkin, 1927f:224).
Imprisonment also diminishes the feelings and
qualities (trust, caring, sociality, self-assertion)
that make one best suitable for social life. The
prisoner is cut off from sufficient and significant
contact with those with whom s/he had previously mostdeveloped and expressed these feelings (family,
chi ldren, friends). Concomitant feelings of
resentment and injustice arise not only from the
:"unjust" punishment endured by the "family members" of
those imprisoned, but also because many prisoners
believe that the exploitations of persons not in
.::prison are greater and that those persons have simply
been more successful in their attempts to exploit.
Moreover, since isolation alternated with
sociality is the natural rhythm of human interaction,
one of the greatest prison tortures is the practice of
i disallowing isolation and, in turn, disallowing
i.sociality (solitary) (Kropotkin, 1913a:160). This
:,practice, along with that of suppressing the will of
* the prisoner, in part springs from the desire to
"'manage, observe, and guard the greatest number of
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prisoners with the fewest possible guards. The ideal
of prison officials would seem to be thousands of
automatons, arising, working, eating, and going to
sleep by means of electronic currents switched on by
one guard. Economies might be produced, then, but no
astonishment should be expressed that persons, when
treated as and reduced to machines, are not, on their
release, the type which society wants (Kropotkin,
1927f:225; 1971).
Thus, while the prison removes persons from
society and from sight, it relentlessly observes,
objectifies, and symbolically uses those confined.
Designed to degrade and make docile, to diminish the
feelings of assertion and person dignity, prison
experience frequently produces a reactive subculture.
Responding to and reflecting the terror and
omnipotence to which prisoners are subjected, the
prison counter-culture teaches one to lie and deceive,
to trust no one, to project invulnerability, and yet,
to share one's knowledge of invasion, appropriation,
and criminality. Ironically, prison authorities are,
as well , dehumanized by penal confinement (Kropotkin,
1927f:227; 1971; 1888). Having little authority and
filled with the spirit of intrigue, scandel, and
spying, the prison authorities' subculture transforms
them into callous, distrusting, unscrupulous, cynical
persecutors. Prison discipline and its reactive
cultures thus produce two sets of persons with little
sense of personal dignity: 1) the "criminals", who
when released from prison frequently have learned how
to more effectively continue to invade others; and 2)
the "authorities", who spend the greater part of each
"work" day invading others' lives and who by doing so
learn more effective modes of invasion.
Kropotkin correctly saw that imprisonment: 1)
had little effect on rates of legally defined crime;
2) produced an increase in career criminality,
frequently increasing the degree of harm subsequently
committed; and 3) reinforced the legitimacy of the
exercise of power over others. Since the social
harms, "crimes", and illegalities of the state and the
owning class were so stark and overt in his time he
neither foresaw that these "crimes" (the wage system
and the state) would become so fully legitimated and
accepted nor did he foresee that prison would become
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such a significant element of the creative processes
that define the reality of crime and criminals,
concealing the illegalities of the owning and ruling
classes and the criminogenic social forms they impose
(Foucault, 1977; Tifft, 1982).
In conclusion, we hope that we have demonstrated
that Kropotkin's analytical framework and orientation
toward the study of criminology can provide an
especially insightful and provocative base from which
to synthesize criminological and political-economic
research and to take humanistic action to alter our
criminal social forms in the interest of all nature.
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1. According to Kropotkin, what benefits humankind in
general must concomitantly benefit individual
vitality and diversity.
2. This is meant to be an illustrative, not an
exhaustive, listing of needs.
3. To appropriate is to deny to others future access
to a resource one does not immediately need.
Appropriation underlies all legal definitions of
crime, whether crimes against persons -
appropriation of human "resources" - or crimes
against property - appropriation of extrahuman
resources (Pepinsky, 1976:36-37). However, it
should be noted that these familiar linguistic
distinctions (person-property) constitute a double
false dichotomy: 1) that persons are entities
distinct from the earth, food, air; and 2) that
persons are not property to be appropriated, which
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they assuredly are considered under the principle
of law or under slavery, conscription, internment,
or wage-labor. When appropriations are legally
proscribed; when detected, they are defined as
crimes. However, appropriation transcends the
legal definition in the sense that many
appropriations are based on legal rights; though
these people may legally deny others future access
to resources. Thus, the concept of appropriation
allows us to explore the appropriations of those
who are now "beyond incrimination" (Kennedy,
1970) , for example those who commit legal
appropriations for reasons of state (e.g. war,
capital punishment, imprisonment, taxation) or
legal appropriations for reasons of profit (e.g.
silent killings, environmental ownership and
pollution) (Swartz, 1975). Note that the concept
of appropriation also underlies the human rights
conception of crime such as that proposed by
the Schwendingers (1970;1977). Appropriation is a
much preferable concept as it does not require
the idea of rights or the need of guardians. Both
these ideas imply elitism, the state, or hierarchy
(Tifft and Sullivan, 1980).
4. There is an irony intrinsic to all bases of
equality - that in order to treat persons equally
one has to treat them differently. This irony is
most clearly seen in the most fundamental meaning
of equality - a recognition of the equal intrinsic
value of every human personality (D. Miller, 1976;
Vlastos, 1962; Frankena, 1962). If we are humanly
equal and yet diverse and unique (different), it
is necessary to specify the equalities or essences
of our equalness in order to provide ethical
guidance for constructing just or moral
relationships between individuals, communities,
societies, or within the world order. A
historical quest for social justice has consisted
largely of attempts to eliminate certain
dissimilarities as bases for difference of
treatment. Distributive justice concepts must
involve a formula or maxim for assessing some
similarities as justifying similar treatment or
some differences, different treatment.
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5. Kropotkin recognized this though not clearly
presenting this altered form of the equality
principle: "the better he has identified himself
with the person's dignity or interest . . . the
more moral will his decision be." (Kropotkin,
1927b:102).
6. According to Kropotkin, hierarchical relationships
and centralized relationships such as those of
state deprive people of the experiences within
which they would develop a sense of shared
interest and responsibility. In these
relationships decision making becomes monopolized
and public issues are placed beyond the reach of
people's experiences and consciousnesses. These
insights are clearly similar to the critical
sociological insights made later by C. Wright
Mills (1959) and Paul Goodman (1963:183) - that
public issues are systematically psychologized and
reduced to personal troubles, and that as the
state grows in size and power, people become more
stupid, and less caring, and vice versa. Also
see Punzo (1976).
7. For an assessment and commentary on Kropotkin's
criminology see Osofsky (1979:102-112, 123-130)
and Capouya and Tompkins (1975:XIII-XIX). For an
assessment of Kropotkin's theoretical perspective
and intellectual context see Galois (1976), M.
Miller (1976), Capouya and Tompkins (1975),
Osofsky (1979), Punzo (1976), Woodcock and
Avakumovic (1950), Kelly (1976), and Kropotkin
(1889).
8. The following quote may aid in seeing the
application of Kropotkin's dualistic analysis
(1913c: November, 1913:86).
The right to work at what a man choses
to work at, and so long as he chooses, thus
remains "the principle" of modern society.
Consequently, the chief accusation we level
at society is that this freedom, so dear to
man, is continually rendered a fiction by the
worker being placed under the necessity of
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"selling" his labour-force to a
capitalist - the modern State being
the chief weapon for maintaining the
working men under this necessity, by
means of the monopolies and privileges
it continually creates in favour of one
class of citizens, to the detriment of
others.
It begins, indeed, to be generally
understood that the fundamental principle,
upon which all are agreed, is continually
evaded by means of a wide-developed system
of monopolies. He who owns nothing becomes
once more the serf of those who possess,
because he is bound to accept the conditions
of the owners of the land, the factory,
the dwelling-houses, the trade, and so
on; he is thus compelled to pay to the
rich - to all the rich - an immence
tribute, as a consequence of the established
monopolies. These monopolies become hateful
to the people, not only on account of the lazy
life they guarantee to the rich, but chiefly
on account of the rights they give to the
monopolists over the working class.
Consequently, the great fault we find
with modern society is, that after having
proclaimed the principle of liberty of work,
it has created such conditions of property-
ownership that "they do not permit the worker
to be the master of his work." They wipe
out this principle, and place the worker in
such a condition that he "must" work to enrich
his masters, and to perpetuate, as it were,
his own inferiority. He is forced to forge
his own chains.
9. See Le Guin (1975) for an extension of this idea
of never-ending revolution. To Le Guin the hope
for survival is the ever continuous breaking down
of barriers, never pausing, but never pressing
revolution. It entails continuous change, a never-
wavering commitment to risk, to the negation of
certainty, for to be certain is to be an exile
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(Tifft and Sullivan, 1979:184). Le Guin (1975:
288-289) says:
The duty of the individual is to accept
no rule, to be the initiator of his own acts,
to be responsible. Only if he does so will the
society live, and change, and adapt, and
survive. . . Revolution is in the individual
spirit, or it is nowhere. It is for all, or
it is nothing. If it is seen as having any
end, it will never truly begin ....
10. These social forms were designed to promote a
future world order which would eliminate
collective violence, repression, and the current
depth and spread of misery, while simultaneously
promoting and preserving human dignity,
collective autonomy and cooperation, and
environmental quality (Falk, 1975a; 1975b; 1978;
Wieck, 1978). The struggle to create such forms
"both transcends and unites different cultures
and historical eoochs" (Moore, 1972:11), and
exposes the institutional basis of the current
world order as both ill-equipped to provide for
the fundamental well-being of most people and
unable to inspire any future hope of such a
capability (Falk, 1975a:10).
11. One should note how Kropotkin's historical
analysis is paralleled in Mark Kennedy's
benchmark article (1970). Note, however, that
Kropotkin (1913c: May, 1914:34) stated that:
When some people say that Capitalism
dates from the fifteenth or sixteenth century,
they affirm something which is not true. Such
an affirmation may aid people in understanding
"the parallel development of the modern State
and Capitalism." But Capitalism existed already
wherever there existed an individual possession
of land, and, later on, the possibility of
cultivating the soil by the hired labour of
the expropriated peasants.
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and furthermore, concluded (1913c: December,
1913: 84):
Born in the times when the Church had
undertaken to govern men in order to bring
them to salvation, inherited by us from the
Roman Empire and the Roman Law, this idea
of an omnipotent and all-organizing State
has silently made its advance during the
second half of the nineteenth century.
12. According to Kropotkin (1913c: December, 1913:
94):
Two great currents of thought and action
have characterized the nineteenth century.
One of them was a systematic fight against
all survivals of serfdom. And the result
of it was that in the laws of Europe personal
servitude has at last disappeared, even in
Russia (1861) and in the Balkan States
(after the war of 1878).
More than that; in every nation man
has worked to conquer personal freedom.
He has freed himself to a great extent
from superstitious respect for nobility,
royalty, and the upper classes; and by a
thousand small acts of revolt, accomplished
in every corner of Europe, he has established -
by using it - his right of being treated as
a free man.
At the same time, all the intellectual
movements of the nineteenth century - its
poetry, its romance, its drama, when they
were something more than a mere amusement
for the leisured class; its history and
philosophy, even its music - have borne in
their highest productions the same character
of a struggle for freeing the individual,
the woman, the child, from the habits and
manners of thought that had been established
by centuries of slavery and serfdom.
But, by the side of this liberating
movement, another movement, which also had
its origin in the Great French Revolution,
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was going on at the same time. And its
purpose was, "to develop the omnipotence of
the State" in the name of that vague and
treacherous conception which has opened
the door to all ambitions - the conception
of public welfare organized, not by the
nation itself in each town and village,
but by its chosen so-called representatives"....
13. Kropotkin (1905:8) also accepted this analysis in
regard to the origins of "international law".
Social customs and habits are anterior to both
state law and laws among the society of states.
The international customs, habits and agreements
which preceded the development of international
law embodied feelings of mutual aid and equality,
and were essential to the very being of world
society.
14. This is a critical point, therefore we include
here a fuller presentation of Kropotkin's
argument (1927a:71-73):
The more we study the question, the more
we are brought to the conclusion that society
itself is responsible for the anti-social deeds
perpetrated in its midst, and that no punishment,
no prisons, and no hangmen can diminish the
numbers of such deeds; nothing short of a
reorganization of society itself.
Three quarters of all the acts which are
brought before our courts every year have their
origin, either directly or indirectly, in the
present disorganized state of society with
regard to the production and distribution of
wealth - not in perversity of human nature.
As to the relatively few anti-social deeds
which result from anti-social inclinations
of separate individuals, it is not by prisons,
nor even by resorting to the hangmen, that
we can diminish their numbers. By our prisons,
we merely multiply them and render them worse.
By our detectives, our "price of blood," our
executions, and our jails, we spread in society
such a terrible flow of basest passions and
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habits, that he who should realize the effects
of these institutions to their full extent
would be frightened by what society is doing
under the pretext of maintaining morality. We
"must" search for other remedies and the
remedies have been indicated long since.
Of course now, when a mother in search
of food and shelter for her children must
pass by shops filled with the most refined
delicacies of refined gluttony; when
gorgeous and insolent luxury is displayed
side by side with the most execrable misery;
when the dog and the horse of a rich man are
far better cared for than millions of children
whose mothers earn a pitiful salary in the pit
or the manufactory; when each "modest" evening
dress of a lady represents eight months, or
one year, of human labor; when enrichment at
somebody else's expense is the avowed aim of
the "upper classes," and no distinct boundary
can be traced between honest and dishonest
means of making money - then force is the
only means for maintaining such a state of
things. Then an army of policemen, judges,
and hangmen becomes a necessary institution.
But if our children - all children are
"our" children 
- received a sound instruction
and education - and we have the means of
giving it; if every family lived in a decent
home - and they "could" at the present high
pitch of our production; if every boy and girl
were taught a handicraft at the same time as
he or she receives scientific instruction, and
"not" to be a manual producer of wealth were
considered as a token of inferiority; if men
lived in closer contact with one another, and
had continually to come into contact on those
public affairs which now are vested in the few;
and if, in consequence of a closer contact, we
were brought to take as lively an interest in
our neighbor's difficulties and pains as we
formerly took in those of our kinfolk - then
we should not resort to policemen and judges,
to prisons and executions.
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15. Please note that these reactions may overlap and
some persons may both attempt to alter the
feelings they have about themselves as well as
those they have for others. David Matza's work
can be seen as excellent development of these
ideas (Matza, 1964:1969).
16. Osofsky (1979:111) points out that:
Kropotkin's prison experiences
reinforced his political views and
provided him with yet another example
of the failure of social institutions
premised on a traditional view of human
nature. In a real sense, he saw prisons
as a microcosm of bourgeouis society.
The prisons were overcrowded and filthy,
like industrial cities. Then there was
"the flagrant immorality of a corps of
jailers who were practically omnipotent
and whose whole function it was to terrorize
and oppress the prisoners, their subjects."
This was a parady of government as the lack
of useful labor and the total absence of all
that could contribute to the moral welfare
of men was a parody of political economy.
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